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Trends in Productivity Growth
in Canada
Allan Crawford, Research Department
• The rate of productivity growth in the United
States was signiﬁcantly higher than that in
Canada during the second half of the 1990s.
• Much of the difference between Canadian and
U.S. rates of productivity growth over this
period was related to information and
communication technology (ICT), with ﬁrms
intheUnitedStatesmakinggreaterproductivity
gains from the use of ICT. Productivity growth
in the sectors producing ICT goods was also
signiﬁcantly higher in the United States.
• International evidence indicates that a variety
of other factors, including investment in
human capital and openness to international
trade, inﬂuence a country’s productivity
performance. High exposure to international
trade has made a positive contribution to
productivity growth in Canada.
• Whether the recent surge in U.S. productivity
will be replicated in Canada is a critical issue
for the future. While there is uncertainty
about future rates of Canadian productivity
growth, it is reasonable to expect some increase
in trend growth relative to the rates of recent
decades.
ecent developments have focused attention
on the possibility that future rates of produc-
tivity growth will rise above those observed
in recent decades. In large measure, this
interest was spurred by a sharp increase in the growth
rate of U.S. labour productivity in the second half of
the 1990s.1 Observers in many countries have asked
whether this surge in productivity is likely to spread
to other economies. Interest in productivity issues has
also risen in recent years owing to expectations that
increased use of information and communication
technology (ICT) will boost productivity growth in
many sectors of the economy.
A good understanding of the determinants of produc-
tivity is important because productivity has far-reach-
ing implications for the economy. For example, Rao
(2001) estimates that lower levels of productivity in
Canada accounted for over 80 per cent of the average
gap in real GDP per capita between Canada and the
United States in the 1990s.2 Thus, closing the produc-
tivity gap would be a crucial element in reducing the
gap in the standard of living between the two countries.
Productivity growth is also an important variable in
the decision-making process for monetary policy.
When implementing a policy of inﬂation control, the
monetary authorities must consider future inﬂation-
ary pressures as measured by the level of output rela-
tive to the economy’s capacity for sustainable
production (potential output).3 Since potential output
1. Unless otherwise indicated, in this article the term “productivity” refers to
labour productivity, deﬁned as output per person-hour. See Box 1 for further
discussion of measurement issues.
2. The remainder of the gap in real GDPper capita is attributed to lower hours
worked per capita in Canada.
3.  Inﬂation will tend to increase (decrease) if actual output is greater (less)
than potential output.
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Box 1: Measurement Issues
There are long-standing concerns that ofﬁcial statis-
tics understate the true rate of productivity growth,
because of measurement problems. Two of the
most prominent concerns are: (i) aggregate produc-
tivity will be understated if the price deﬂators used
to calculate real output do not fully capture
improvements in product quality; and (ii) output
(and therefore productivity) is particularly difﬁcult
to measure in many of the service sectors.
Deﬂators and Quality Adjustments
Real output and productivity will be measured
incorrectly if the price indexes used as deﬂators are
not adjusted to eliminate the inﬂuence of changes
in quality on observed prices. Statistical agencies
use various techniques to construct quality-adjusted
measures of price change. Biases are introduced,
however, if the correct quality adjustments are not
made, and this task may be especially difﬁcult for
durable goods in times of rapid technological
change.
In some cases, biased deﬂators may have a greater
effect on the allocation of measured productivity
growth across sectors than on the aggregate meas-
ure of productivity. This can be illustrated by not-
ing that Statistics Canada uses the “double
deﬂation” method to construct real output (value-
added). In this technique, nominal levels of gross
output and intermediate inputs are deﬂated sepa-
rately, and then the real value of intermediate
inputs is subtracted from real gross output. An
upward bias in the price deﬂator for an intermedi-
ate input would cause real intermediate inputs to
be understated. Thus, real value-added and pro-
ductivity would be overstated in sectors using this
input, whereas the upward bias would cause pro-




Measuring output may be particularly problematic
in the service sector.1 In some service industries
such as banking, there is not even consensus on the
appropriate concept of output. Moreover, output in
some sectors(suchas somecomponents of business
services and ﬁnancial services) is often imputed by
Statistics Canada from the levels of inputs, thereby
biasing downwards the sectoral measures of pro-
ductivity. These difﬁculties imply that extra caution
is warranted when using productivity data for
many of the service sectors.2
A ﬁnal issue concerns the comparability of produc-
tivity data from different countries. Newly released
data can be revised signiﬁcantly over time. This
means that currently available data may sometimes
be a misleading indicator of the true differences in
performance across countries. The Canada-U.S.
comparisons reported in this article could also be
misleading to the extent that the national statistical
agencies use different techniques (such as different
methods of quality adjustment) to construct their
data.3 Statistics Canada’s recent move to capitalize
software expenditures has eliminated one of the
differences in methodology.
1.  The April 1999 special issue of the Canadian Journal of Economics con-
tains articles on service sector productivity. Maclean (1997) also discusses
measurement issues in the service sector.
2.  A Statistics Canada study (Beckstead, Girard, and Harchaoui 2001)
assigns the productivity data for each sector a rating of “reliable,”
“moderately reliable,” or “unreliable.” Business services and ﬁnance,
insurance, and real estate are two of the service sectors receiving the
lowest ranking based on perceived shortcomings in the methods used
to construct the real output series. Productivity data for manufacturing
are given a rating of “reliable.”
3. Harchaoui, Kaci, and Maynard (2001) discuss the comparability of pro-
ductivity data published by the Canadian and U.S. statistical agencies.21 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
depends on the trend level of productivity, forming a
view on future inﬂationary pressures requires taking
into account the expected future path of productivity.
Knowledge of the determinants of productivity growth
and of the prospects for future growth are therefore
important for the conduct of monetary policy.
This article describes the trends in productivity growth
in Canada since the early 1960s and summarizes our
current knowledge about the causes of the historical
patterns. Particular attention is given to assessing the
contribution of ICT to the recent divergence in produc-
tivity growth between Canada and the United States.
Other determinants of productivity growth, such as
human capital and a country’s openness to interna-
tional trade and investment, are also discussed.
Formal international comparisons of productivity
growth are restricted to the Canada/U.S. case. The
focus on the United States is motivated by its position
as Canada’s major trading partner and productivity
leader in many sectors. In addition, Canadian data are
probably more comparable with U.S. data than with
those for many other countries.
Past Trends in Canadian Productivity
Growth
In this section, the broad trends in labour productivity
growth in Canada over the past four decades are sum-
marized. Table 1 shows average rates of productivity
growth for the total business sector and the manufac-
turing sector over selected subperiods.4
The productivity performance of the Canadian busi-
ness sector since the early 1960s can be separated into















1.3 2.4 1.5 2.9
1.6 2.6
0.9 4.9
1.0 2.1 2.0 3.9
a. 1978–95 for U.S. manufacturing
b. Ofﬁcial productivity data for the manufacturing sector are currently available to 2000.
two distinct periods: 1962–73 and 1974–2001. The
annual change in labour productivity averaged close
to 4 per cent up to 1973 and then fell sharply to only
1.3 per cent for the 1974–95 period. Over the 1996–2001
period—the period of rapid productivity gains in the
UnitedStates—growthincreasedmodestlyto1.6percent.
There has been much interest in evaluating whether
the observed growth in Canadian productivity in the
late 1990s shows any signs of an increase in trend pro-
ductivity growth. This is a difﬁcult question because
year-to-year changes in productivity growth can be
affected by cyclical movements in output. Since pro-
ductivity growth tends to move pro-cyclically,5 some
of the growth over this period could reﬂect the usual
rebound during the recovery phase of the business
cycle. It is therefore necessary to control for cyclical
effects when estimating trend growth, and extreme
caution must be used when drawing conclusions from
short periods of time or from comparisons of periods
spanning different stages of the cycle. It is interesting
to note, however, that productivity growth in the
Canadian business sector over the 1996–2001 period
was somewhat stronger than over a similar stage of
the previous cycle (1984 to 1988).
At the sectoral level, the post-1973 slowdown occurred
in both business-sector services and manufacturing.
Most recently, these sectors have followed different
paths. Rao and Tang (2001) report that productivity
growth in the service sector strengthened in the second
half of the 1990s relative to the 1989–95 period. In con-
trast, following strong gains in the late 1980s and early
1990s, average labour-productivity growth in manu-
facturing fell to about 1 per cent in the 1996–2000 period
(Table 1).
A productivity slowdown also occurred in the U.S.
business sector after 1973. Unlike the Canadian case,
however, a signiﬁcant pickup was observed over the
1996–2001 period, as the average growth rate in labour
productivity increased to 2.6 per cent; this rebound
pushed labour-productivity growth in the U.S. busi-
ness sector one percentage point above the Canadian
rate. The difference between Canadian and U.S.
performance was even greater in the manufacturing
sector, where the average growth increased to almost
5 per cent in the United States. The pickup in U.S.
productivity growth was broadly based, since higher
5.  Because it is costly to adjust employment, labour input tends to fall less
rapidly than output in the initial stages of a downturn. Thus, labour produc-
tivity growth tends to fall below its long-run trend at these times. Conversely,
labour inputs may increase slowly as the economy starts to improve, so pro-
ductivity growth tends to rise above its trend in the recovery stage of the cycle.22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
rates were also observed in the service sector, most
notably in wholesale and retail trade (Rao and Tang
2001).
Over the 1996–2001 period . . .
labour productivity growth in the
U.S. business sector [was] one
percentage point above the Canadian
rate.
Simple growth models would predict that the diffu-
sion of technologies and factor mobility would cause
productivity levels in Canada to converge over time
towards the higher levels in the United States. To
provide some longer-run perspective on convergence,
Chart 1 shows indexes of relative labour productivity
in Canada, deﬁned as the ratio of Canadian to U.S.
productivity using an arbitrary base year indexed to
100.6 Periods of convergence towards (divergence
from) U.S. levels occur when the index of relative pro-
ductivity in Chart 1 is rising (falling). There was some
convergence of productivity in the Canadian business
sector towards U.S. levels over the 1970s, but these
gains have been more than reversed by the downward
movements in the second half of the 1980s and the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. Thus, while the late 1990s con-
tributed to the decline in Canada’s relative
productivity, the beginning of the downward trend
can be traced to an earlier date. The deterioration in
relative performance in the late 1980s coincided with a
period of very weak productivity growth in Canada’s
business sector, whereas the more recent decline
reﬂects the increase in U.S. growth (Chart 2).
In the manufacturing sector, there was quite strong
convergencetowardsU.S.productivity levelsfromthe
early 1960s until the mid-1970s.7 Once again, this con-
vergence has been more than reversed, with the index
of relative productivity having fallen by approxi-
6. These indexes measure changes in relative productivity since the base year.
Thus, the level of the index does not measure the absolute difference in pro-
ductivity levels between the two countries.
7.  Because of data availability, comparisons of the Canadian and U.S. manu-
facturing sectors in the 1960s and early 1970s must use productivity data cal-
culated from different measures of output. U.S. data for this period are based
on a measure of gross output less intra-sectoral sales and transfers, whereas
the Canadian data use real value-added. The graph for the manufacturing
sector (Chart 1) covers the 1977–2000 period for which data are available for
both countries on a value-added basis.
mately 25 per cent since the mid-1980s (bottom panel
of Chart 1). Given the relatively weak productivity
gains in Canadian manufacturing recently, Rao and
Tang (2001) estimate that the absolute gap between
the levels of labour productivity in Canada and the
United States had widened to 35 per cent in the man-
ufacturing sector by 2000 (compared with 18 per cent
for the economy-wide gap).8
A comparison of Canadian and U.S. trends at a more
disaggregated level shows whether the productivity
8.  International comparisons of productivity levels are difﬁcult, because
output levels must be converted to a common currency using a conversion
factor based on cross-country differences in producer prices. Typically, there
is limited information on these price differences.
Chart 1
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gaps are widespread throughout the economy or con-
centrated in certain sectors. From 1995 to 1999, Can-
ada recorded stronger productivity growth than the
United States in primary industries and construction
but weaker growth in most of the major service-sector
categories (Rao and Tang 2001). In manufacturing, the
large gap between Canadian and U.S. rates of produc-
tivity growth is explained by very rapid U.S. gains in
the electrical/electronic equipment and other machin-
ery and equipment sectors. Rao (2001) reports that, in
1997, Canadian levels of labour productivity exceeded
those in the United States in only a few resource-based
industries and were substantially lower in the
machinery and equipment and electrical/electronic
equipment sectors.
In summary, Canada’s relative productivity perform-
ance has deteriorated since the mid-1980s. Most recently,
U.S. labour productivity grew at rates signiﬁcantly
above those in Canada and in many other industrial-
ized countries. Possible explanations for these trends
are now discussed.
Contributions of ICT to Productivity
Growth
Many observers have attributed a large part of the
recent surge in U.S. productivity to efﬁciency gains
from the production and use of information and com-
munication technology. ICT is typically deﬁned to
include computer hardware, computer software, and
telecommunications equipment. Driven by sharp






























especially computer hardware, have increased at an
extremely fast pace. From 1995 to 2000, the stock of
computer hardware per person-hour in the U.S. busi-
ness sector rose at an average annual rate of 36 per
cent (Chart 3). Similar growth rates were observed in
Canada over the same period.
The hypothesized link between ICT investment and
productivity growth is consistent with the view that
ICT is a “general-purpose technology” with produc-
tivity-enhancing applications in many sectors of the
economy. To give just a few examples, ICT may raise
productivity by providing more efﬁcient means of
processing information, better systems for managing
product distribution and inventories, and more efﬁ-
cient methods of designing and producing manufac-
tured goods.
Several studies have estimated the impact of informa-
tion technology on labour productivity using the
“growth-accounting” methodology. As described in
Box 2, this technique can be used to measure the con-
tribution to labour-productivity growth from each of
the following channels: (i) changes in the capital-
labour ratio for ICT capital goods (ICT capital deepen-
ing); (ii) changes in the capital-labour ratio for non-ICT
capital (non-ICT capital deepening); (iii) changes in
labour quality; and (iv) changes in multifactor pro-
ductivity (MFP). Changes in MFP represent the change
in output from sources other than changes in inputs
and labour quality.
Chart 3




Source: Canadian data for computer hardware and person-hours are from Statistics
Canada. U.S. data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the
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Box 2: Measuring the Sources of Productivity Growth
Labour productivity is the amount of output
produced per hour of labour input. It depends on a
number of factors, including the current state of
technology and the quantities of other inputs used
in the production process.
The link between investment in capital goods and
productivity is critical when analyzing the sources
of labour-productivity growth. To illustrate this
relationship, consider a simple Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction technology in which real output  is pro-
duced using capital and labour inputs:
, (1)
where  is the quantity of capital,  is hours of
labour input, and  is multifactor productivity.
The exponent  is interpreted as the percentage
change in output resulting from a 1 per cent change
in the quantity of capital (holding technology and
the amount of labour unchanged). The exponent
 has a similar interpretation as the percentage
change in output following a 1 per cent change in
labour input. Changes in multifactor productivity
measure the change in output from sources other
than changes in capital and labour inputs.
With perfect competition and constant returns to
scale, the sum of the  exponents equals one, and
 and  are measured by the shares of aggre-
gate income earned by capital and labour, respec-
tively. In this case, the level of labour productivity
is determined by multifactor productivity and the












Thus, labour-productivity growth can be decom-
posed into the contributions from the change in
multifactor productivity and the change in the
capital-to-labour ratios (capital deepening).1 An
increase in the amount of capital available per
person-hour will raise labour productivity.
In empirical studies, the contribution of informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) to
labour-productivity growth is estimated using
modiﬁed versions of the framework just described.
In these studies, equations (1) and (2) are extended
to include different types of capital goods (e.g., ICT
versus non-ICT capital). When analyzing the total
effect of ICT on labour productivity, they distin-
guish between the contribution to productivity
growth from the use of ICT goods and the contribu-
tion from the sectors that produce ICT goods. The
contribution from capital deepening by users of ICT
is estimated by the product of the income share of
ICT and the growth rate of ICT capital per person-
hour. The contribution from multifactor productivity
(MFP) growth in ICT-producing sectors is included
in the term for the growth rate of aggregate MFP.
1. Speciﬁcally, equation (2) implies that the growth rate of labour produc-
tivity is equal to the growth rate of multifactor productivity plus the
income share of capital ( ) multiplied by the growth rate of capital per
person-hour. Although not included in the simple model described in this
box, changes in the average quality of labour would also affect the
growth of labour productivity.
YL ¤ AK L ¤ ()
aK =
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In empirical studies, the total effect of ICT on labour
productivity is calculated as the sum of the contribu-
tions from the use of ICT goods by ﬁrms plus the con-
tributions from the sectors that produce ICT goods. The
former is measured by the ﬁrst channel in the above
list. The additional contribution from more efﬁcient
production by ICT producers is included in the term
for aggregate multifactor productivity growth. Empir-
ical results from U.S. and Canadian studies of this
type are now presented below.
U.S. studies
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2001) applied the growth-
accounting methodology to U.S. data for the private
sector.9,10 Their results suggest that ICT was the domi-
nant factor underlying the recent improvement in the
growth of U.S. labour productivity. Over the 1995–2000
period, the total contribution from ICT use and MFP
gains in ICT-producing sectors rose to 1.27 percentage
points (Table 2). Increased ICT use explained almost
50 per cent of the acceleration in the rate of labour-
productivity growth over this period, while ICT pro-
duction contributed another 30 per cent.11
Gordon (2000) went a step further by separating the
observed increase in U.S. productivity growth in the
second half of the 1990s into estimates of the increase
in trend productivity growth and the cyclical effect.
After accounting for improved methods of price deﬂa-
tion and changes in labour quality, he estimates that
the increase in trend labour-productivity growth was
0.64 percentage points, with the pickup coming largely
from ICT capital deepening and faster MFP growth in
the computer-producing sectors.
The growth-accounting exercises are mechanical
decompositions conducted at the level of aggregate
business sector output. If ICT has an important effect
on productivity, there should be corroborating evi-
dence at a more disaggregated level. That is, after con-
trolling for other factors, the ﬁrms or industries that
9. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh’s measure of output is broader in coverage than
the measure used to construct the ofﬁcial U.S. productivity data. Their output
series includes the non-proﬁt sector and imputed capital service ﬂows from
residential housing and consumer durables. Evidence from other studies
indicates that use of the broader output measure will tend to reduce the esti-
mated ICT contribution by a small amount.
10.  Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh use data for the ﬂow of capital services, which
are calculated by multiplying rental prices by the effective capital stocks. The
Canadian study by Armstrong et al. (2002), discussed below, also uses a
measure of the ﬂow of capital services.
11.  Oliner and Sichel (2000) reached similar conclusions about the contribu-
tion of ICT in the second half of the 1990s. In contrast to the study by Jorgen-
son, Ho, and Stiroh, their study (and Gordon 2000) used the ofﬁcial
productivity statistics.
use ICT most intensively should display signiﬁcantly
better productivity performance. Disaggregated
econometric analysis has been done in a number of
U.S. studies, including Stiroh (2001) who uses data for
a broad cross-section of approximately 60 sectors, and
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1995,1998, 2000a, and 2000b)
who use micro-data for individual ﬁrms. Overall,
their results conﬁrm that ICT use is an important
determinant of productivity.
Stiroh (2001) also examines the importance of ICT by
breaking down the change in aggregate labour pro-
ductivity into the contributions from three sets of
industries: intensive ICT users, ICT-producing sectors,
and the remaining sectors. This breakdown suggests
that almost all of the increase in U.S. productivity
growth can be traced to sectors that either produce or
use ICT intensively.12 Since the gains were broadly
based throughout the ICT-intensive sectors and were
not found in the less-ICT-intensive sectors, he rejects
the view that the cyclical recovery and ICT production
were the dominant sources of the surge in U.S. pro-
ductivity. The signiﬁcant role for structural factors is
consistent with the fact that the productivity spurt
occurred relatively late in the U.S. economic expansion
(a time when productivity growth typically weakens).
Canadian studies
Armstrong, Harchaoui, Jackson, and Tarkhani (2002)
analyzed the individual sources of labour-productiv-
ity growth in Canada. Their calculations suggest that
12.  Similarly, Sharpe (2000) argues that the increases in productivity growth
in the U.S. service sector (particularly wholesale and retail trade) can be




MFP growth in ICT-
producing sectors
Otherc
Total contribution from ICT
(capital deepening + MFP growth
in ICT-producing sectors)
Table 2
Sources of Labour-Productivity Growth
U.S. private sector
1959–73 1973–95 1995–00 Change:
1973–95
to 1995–00
2.97 1.44 2.36 0.92
0.16 0.32 0.76 0.44
0.10 0.24 0.51 0.27
2.71 0.88 1.09 0.21
0.26 0.56 1.27 0.71
a. Average annual growth rate
b. Percentage points per year
c. Includes non-ICT capital deepening, labour quality, and MFP growth at non-ICT
producers
Source: Jorgenson Ho, and Stiroh (2001)26 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
ICT use contributed 0.4 percentage points to average
productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s
(Table 3). Unlike the U.S. results reported earlier, there
was no increase (relative to 1988–95) in the effect of
ICT capital deepening over this period.13 For the other
sources of labour-productivity growth, they report a
sharp increase in MFP growth and lower contributions
from non-ICT capital and labour quality.
Armstrong et al. do not estimate the contribution of
the ICT-producing sector to MFP growth in Canada.
For comparison with U.S. results, a rough measure of
the total ICT contribution is obtained by combining
their estimate of the capital-deepening effect and the
estimated MFP effect found by Muir and Robidoux
(2001). The estimated total ICT contribution over the
past ﬁve years in Canada (0.6 percentage points) is
approximately half of the U.S. level during the same
period, with no increase relative to 1988–95. Thus, the
growth-accountingstudiesimplythat ICTaccountsfor
much of the recent divergence in labour-productivity
growth between Canada and the United States.
The lower ICT effect in Canada reflects smaller estimates
of the gains from both ICT use and ICT production.
Table 4 presents information to explain these results.
As noted in Box 2, the estimated effect from ICT use
is calculated as the product of the growth rate of ICT
capital per person-hour and the ICT income share. The
smaller contribution from ICT use largely reﬂects the
13.  Khan and Santos (2002) reach conclusions similar to those of Armstrong
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a. Average annual growth rate
b. Percentage points per year
c. From Table 3 in Muir and Robidoux (2001). Their estimates cover the periods 1991–95
and 1996–00.
Source: Armstrong et al. (2002).
lower estimate of the income share for ICT capital in
Canada. There is a smaller effect from ICT production
for two reasons. First, the industries producing ICT
goods account for a smaller share of Canadian output.
In addition, productivity growth in the ICT-producing
sector is considerably lower in Canada than in the
United States. From 1995 to 2000, output per worker
in ICT manufacturing increased at an average annual
rate of about 14 per cent in Canada, compared with
43 per cent in the United States (Rao and Tang 2001).14
Some of this gap in productivity growth reﬂects differ-
ences in the mix of goods produced by the ICT sectors
in the two countries (e.g., whereas the U.S. manufac-
tures computer chips—an industry with high rates of
productivity growth—Canada does not produce these
goods).
Growth-accounting analysis provides estimates of the
contribution of ICT to aggregate productivity growth.
Baldwin and Sabourin (2002) provide microecono-
metric conﬁrmation that ICT investment signiﬁcantly
affects productivity in the Canadian manufacturing
sector. Using micro data for individual plants, they
find a positive relationship between the use of computer-
based technologies in 1998 and the cumulative growth
in relative labour productivity over the 1988–97 period
(compared with other plants in the same narrowly
14.  Note that these ﬁgures are growth rates of labour productivity in ICT
manufacturing, whereas the estimated contributions from ICT production in




ICT Use and Production
ICT use ICT
(1996-00) productiona
ICT Average growth rate Share of
income per person-hour ICT goods
shareb in business
(per- Hardwarec Software Com- sector value-
centage munication added (1998)
points) equipment
2.87 32.7 11.7 5.0 1.81
6.3 36.3 13.0 7.4 2.56
a. From Annex Table 2 of Pilat and Lee (2001). The deﬁnition of ICT goods includes such
categories as ofﬁce and computing machinery, electronic equipment, and industrial-
process-control equipment.
b. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2001) and Armstrong et al. (2002) do not report the income
shares of ICT capital in their studies. The U.S. income shares shown in this table are
from Oliner and Sichel (2000) and the Canadian shares are from Khan and Santos
(2002). The U.S. shares cover the period 1996–99.
c: The table reports growth rates of capital stocks per person-hour. Jorgenson, Ho, and
Stiroh (2001) and Armstrong et al. (2002) use growth rates of the ﬂow of capital services
per person-hour.27 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
deﬁned industry). The relationship between produc-
tivity gains and ICT use was particularly strong for
plants that had adopted applications from all three of
the major categories of ICT technologies (software,
hardware, and network communications).
ICT accounts for much of the recent
divergence in labour-productivity
growth between Canada and the
United States.
The lagged effects of ICT investment
Attempts to identify the effects of ICT investment are
complicated by evidence of signiﬁcant lags between
the timing of these investments and their full impact
on productivity. Using data for large U.S. ﬁrms, Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt (2000a) ﬁnd that the returns from ICT
investment are two to ﬁve times greater over periods
of 5 to 7 years than over a 1-year period. Thus, ICT
investment appears to be a leading indicator of pro-
ductivity growth.
One explanation for the long lags is that ﬁrms must
fundamentally alter their business practices and
organizational structures in order to fully exploit the
advantages of these new technologies. It may take
time for ﬁrms to learn what changes are needed to
make effective use of new technologies, and delays
may also occur because these adjustments are costly
and time-consuming. As a result, the productivity
gains from information technologies will rise over
time as ﬁrms are gradually able to implement these
changes. Schaan and Anderson (2001) report survey
evidence of these types of adjustment problems in
the Canadian manufacturing sector. Approximately
90 per cent of manufacturing firms that innovated
(deﬁned as having introduced new production proc-
esses or developed new products) during the 1997–99
period experienced difﬁculties that “slowed down or
caused problems.” The most common problems were
an inability to devote staff to projects on an ongoing
basis because of current production requirements,
high costs of development, and lack of skilled person-
nel. Econometric support for the complementarity of
ICT and organizational changes is provided by Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt (1998), who find that ICT has a greater
effect on productivity when ﬁrms adopt more decen-
tralized decision-making processes.
Other Determinants of Productivity
Growth
The previous section highlighted the role of informa-
tion technology, given its prominence in recent discus-
sions. This section considers a broader set of factors
that determine productivity growth. Relevant empiri-
cal evidence can be obtained from the cross-country
growth literature. In these studies, time-series data
from a number of countries are used to determine
how growth rates of real output per capita are affected
by changes in inputs (physical and human capital),
structural government policies, and institutional con-
ditions such as the development of financial markets.15
Based on his assessment of the cross-country litera-
ture, Harris (1999) concludes that the three most
important factors affecting growth are investment in
machinery and equipment, human capital formation,
and openness to trade and investment. In various
ways, each factor strengthens productivity growth by
promoting innovation and the diffusion of new tech-
nologies. A brief overview of Canadian evidence on
these issues is provided below, as well as a review of
the importance to aggregate productivity growth of
resource reallocation across different ﬁrms in the same
industry. Recent discussions regarding the relation-
ship between the exchange rate and productivity are
also summarized.
Investment in machinery and equipment
The ratio of business investment in machinery and
equipment ( M&E )  to GDP tends to be an important
determinant of productivity growth in the cross-coun-
try studies. One reason for this ﬁnding is that new
capital goods incorporate productivity-enhancing
technological progress. On average, the ratio of M & E
to GDP was virtually identical in Canada and the
United States during the 1960s (Chart 4). More
recently, the decade averages have trended upwards
in the United States but have remained relatively
unchanged in Canada, with the result that the average
ratio in the 1990s was about 1.5 percentage points
lower in Canada. The evidence from cross-country
growth studies suggests that the growing gap in this
ratio may have contributed to the deterioration
in Canada’s relative productivity performance.
15.  For example, policy and institutional variables in the recent study of
OECD countries by Bassanini, Scarpetta, and Hemmings (2001) include meas-
ures of inﬂation (level and variability), ﬁscal variables (tax rates and expendi-
tures), R & D intensity, measures of ﬁnancial development (business credit
and stock market capitalization), and exposure to international trade.28 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
High levels of spending on machinery and equipment
(including ICT goods) led to a sharp increase in the
U.S. ratio beginning in 1993. The lag between the start
of the acceleration in the pace of investment spending
in the early 1990s and the surge in U.S. productivity
growth later in the decade is consistent with the view
that some of the productivity payoffs from invest-
ments are not realized immediately. The Canadian
investment ratio did not rise above the level of the late
1980s until 1997, four years after the pickup in the
United States. If the timing hypothesis is correct, these
high levels of investment should raise trend produc-
tivity growth in Canada over the next few years
(Macklem and Yetman 2001). Despite the recent
increases, however, the ratio of investment in machin-
ery and equipment to GDP in 2001 was about 1 per-
centage point lower in Canada than in the United
States.
Investment in human capital
Increases in human capital can contribute to produc-
tivity growth by enabling ﬁrms to develop new tech-
nologies or capture the full beneﬁts when adopting
technologies developed elsewhere. Investment in
human capital can take the form of increased quantity
of education (e.g., average years of schooling) or
increased quality. Historically, the average number of
years of formal education has been very similar in
Canada and the United States: in 1998, this measure
was 12.9 in Canada and 12.7 in the United States, com-
pared with the OECD average of 11.3 (Bassanini,
Chart 4
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Scarpetta, and Hemmings 2001). Hanuschek and
Kimko (2000) and Barro (2001) report cross-country
evidence that the quality of schooling, as proxied by
student scores on standardized international exams in
sciences, has a stronger effect on growth than the
quantity of schooling.
Rodriguez and Sargent (2001) compare alternative
measures of human capital for Canada and the United
States, including the proportion of the population
with higher education and indexes that take into
account changes in the average quality of labour. On
balance, they conclude that the current levels (and
recent rates of change) of human capital per worker
are similar in the two countries. Additional evidence
on the quality of human capital is provided by a
recent OECD Study, which reports that 15-year-old
Canadian students outperformed their U.S. counter-
parts in international exams on reading, mathematics,
and science (Sweetman 2002).
Openness to trade and investment
Cross-country growth studies proxy the degree of
openness using measures of international trade ﬂows
and foreign direct investment. Openness may contrib-
ute to productivity growth by facilitating the diffusion
of technologies. Low trade and regulatory barriers
may also promote more efﬁcient allocation of
resources and the achievement of economies of scale
in production.
Several pieces of Canadian evidence are consistent
with the hypothesis that openness contributes to
growth. First, Treﬂer (1999) ﬁnds that tariff reductions
under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
increased labour-productivity growth in the manufac-
turing sector over the 1989–96 period. Second, produc-
tivity growth has been stronger at foreign-controlled
establishments in the manufacturing sector, and these
establishments are more likely to adopt computer-
based technologies than domestically controlled com-
panies (Baldwin and Dhaliwal 2001). Other evidence
of openness effects is provided by Gera, Wu, and Lee
(1999). Using industry-level data, they show that
spillovers from foreign research and development
(R & D) spending (embodied in purchases of imported
intermediate goods and services) are a signiﬁcant
determinant of labour-productivity growth in Can-
ada.16 These R & D spillover effects are particularly
16.  For the most recent period in their study (1990–93), the R & D embodied
in imports accounted for approximately 65 per cent of the total R & D inten-
sity in the Canadian business sector (deﬁned as the industry’s own R & D
spending plus the R & D embodied in purchases of domestic and foreign
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important in the case of imported information technol-
ogy goods.
The intensity of domestic R & D spending is a signiﬁ-
cant determinant of productivity growth in the empir-
ical literature. To some extent, the spillover effects
from foreign R & D offset the impact of low domestic
R & D spending in Canada. In 1997, Canada had the
second lowest ratio of domestic R & D spending to
GDP among the G-7 countries, although this gap has
closed somewhat since 1990 (Rao et al. 2001).
Micro evidence: Implications for aggregate
productivity growth
There is an extensive body of literature from research-
ers who have examined productivity using micro data
for individual ﬁrms or establishments. Two stylized
facts emerge from these studies: (i) there is considerable
heterogeneity of levels and growth rates of productivity
across ﬁrms in the same sector; and (ii) there is exten-
sive reallocation of output and inputs among ﬁrms
within sectors (encompassing both expansions and
contractions of existing ﬁrms as well as the entries and
exits of ﬁrms). Both stylized facts occur in the Cana-
dian manufacturing sector: (i) small plants have lower
levels and growth rates of productivity than larger
plants (Baldwin and Dhaliwal 2001; Baldwin, Jarmin,
and Tang 2002); and (ii) 47 per cent of market share
was transferred from losers to gainers of market share
between 1988 and 1997, with the relative productivity
of gainers rising by 23 per cent (Baldwin and Sabourin
2002). These ﬁndings imply that a signiﬁcant share of
aggregate productivity growth can be attributed to
resource reallocation across different ﬁrms in the same
industry. Thus, structural and regulatory policies
affecting the entry/exit decisions of ﬁrms and factor
mobility will have an impact on aggregate productiv-
ity growth.
Micro evidence may also help to condition our judg-
ment when we form a view on future rates of trend
productivity growth. For example, small- and medium-
sized ﬁrms are less likely to adopt new advanced tech-
nologies, and adoption rates by these ﬁrms are lower
in Canada than in the United States (Baldwin and Sab-
ourin 1998).17 Since small ﬁrms account for a larger
share of manufacturing output in Canada (Baldwin,
Jarmin, and Tang 2002), productivity gains from
17. In 1998, large ﬁrms in the Canadian manufacturing sector were more than
twice as likely to use advanced technologies as smaller ﬁrms (Baldwin and
Sabourin 2000).
investment in advanced technologies could occur here
at a slower pace.
Exchange rate effects
Courchene and Harris (1999) have suggested that
depreciation of the Canadian dollar may have contrib-
uted to the deterioration in the relative productivity
performance of Canada since the 1980s. Advocates of
this hypothesis have identiﬁed two potential channels
for the adverse effects on productivity. First, by raising
the cost of imported capital goods, exchange rate
depreciation could lower the domestic capital-to-
labour ratio and the relative productivity of Canadian
producers. In addition, Courchene and Harris claim
that domestic ﬁrms may have become less vigilant in
their efforts to reduce costs and improve productivity,
because depreciation has sheltered them from the
pressures of global competition. This argument is
inconsistent with the standard theoretical assumption
of proﬁt-maximizing behaviour, since it implies that
ﬁrms have foregone opportunities to increase proﬁta-
bility by raising productivity. Lafrance and Schembri
(2000) and Laidler and Aba (2002) provide more
detailed critiques of the Courchene-Harris hypothesis.
Rao and Tang (2001) demonstrate that ICT manufac-
turing accounts for all of the divergence in productivity
growth between the Canadian and U.S. manufacturing
sectors in the second half of the 1990s. If exchange rate
effects were a major cause of the weaker productivity
growth in Canada, we would expect the productivity
differences to be more broadly based across the manu-
facturingindustries.Furthermore,insomesectorsthat
have supposedly been sheltered by the exchange rate
(such as primary industries, transportation equipment,
and furniture and ﬁxtures), productivity growth was
stronger in Canada than in the United States during
the 1990s.
Outlook for Future Productivity Growth
As noted in the introduction, trend productivity
growth is an important variable in the decision-making
process for monetary policy because it affects the
growth rate of an economy’s potential output and,
therefore,demandpressuresrelativetooverallcapacity.
This section brings together some of the arguments
favouring a pickup in trend productivity growth in
Canada.
There are positive signs suggesting that future trend
productivity growth in Canada will exceed the histori-
cal average from the post-1973 era.30 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
• Investment in machinery and equipment
increased as a share of GDP over the 1990s.
Given the lags between the timing of invest-
ment and the realization of productivity
gains, this increased investment should
support higher trend productivity growth,
at least over the very near term. If the ratio of
M & E to GDP is sustained at the higher level,
a more persistent period of higher trend
growth would be expected.
• Increased ICT use was a major source of the
acceleration in the rate of U.S. productivity
growth. With further declines in the relative
price of ICT goods, continued diffusion of
these technologies in Canada should support
future productivity growth in many sectors.
• Canada has a high exposure to international
trade and investment. Empirical evidence
indicates that this openness promotes the
diffusion of knowledge and new technologies.
• Canada’s macro framework of low (and
stable) inﬂation and improved ﬁscal positions
provides a good supporting environment for
efﬁcient decision-making by ﬁrms.
• U.S. productivity growth was surprisingly
strong through 2001 despite the cyclical
downturn (Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 2001).
This suggests that a signiﬁcant part of the
surge in U.S. growth will be sustained. To the
extent that the underlying factors (such as
ICT) are common to Canada and the United
States, there is reason to expect stronger trend
growth in Canada.
Reasons for a more cautious perspective on future
trend productivity growth (relative to the United
States) include the following points.
• ICT-producing industries, which have made
major contributions to the high productivity
growth in the U.S. manufacturing sector,
account for a smaller share of Canadian
output. In addition, although productivity
gains in ICT production have also been strong
in Canada, they have been signiﬁcantly lower
than in the United States. Some of this
difference in growth rates reﬂects structural
differences in the composition of ICT output.
• Canadian ﬁrms appear to be slower to adopt
new technologies.
• Canada has a relatively low rate of domestic
R & D spending.
It seems reasonable to anticipate some
increase in trend productivity growth
in Canada relative to the levels
observed since the mid-1970s.
One characteristic of a “general-purpose technology”
such as ICT is considerable uncertainty about the long-
run consequences for trend productivity growth and
the timing of these effects. This makes it difﬁcult to
forecast the trends in productivity growth over the
next decade.18 While recognizing this uncertainty, on
balance it seems reasonable to anticipate some increase
in trend productivity growth in Canada relative to the
levels observed since the mid-1970s.
18. The focus of Canadian monetary policy on inﬂation control can be helpful
in dealing with this uncertainty about trend productivity growth and potential
output. For example, if actual inﬂation is persistently lower than projected, it
would indicate that potential output is probably greater than the current estimate.31 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2002
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